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Abstract—We consider the problem of efficient on-line anomaly
detection in computer network traffic. The problem is ap-
proached statistically, as that of sequential (quickest) changepoint
detection. A multi-cyclic setting of quickest change detection
is a natural fit for this problem. We propose a novel score-
based multi-cyclic detection algorithm. The algorithm is based on
the so-called Shiryaev–Roberts procedure. This procedure is as
easy to employ in practice and as computationally inexpensive
as the popular Cumulative Sum chart and the Exponentially
Weighted Moving Average scheme. The likelihood ratio based
Shiryaev–Roberts procedure has appealing optimality properties,
particularly it is exactly optimal in a multi-cyclic setting geared
to detect a change occurring at a far time horizon. It is therefore
expected that an intrusion detection algorithm based on the
Shiryaev–Roberts procedure will perform better than other de-
tection schemes. This is confirmed experimentally for real traces.
We also discuss the possibility of complementing our anomaly
detection algorithm with a spectral-signature intrusion detection
system with false alarm filtering and true attack confirmation
capability, so as to obtain a synergistic system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has never been a safe place and designing auto-
mated and efficient techniques for rapid detection of computer
network anomalies (e.g., due to intrusions) never ceased to be
a topical problem in cybersecurity [1]. Many existing anomaly-
based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS-s) operate by applying
the machinery of statistics to comb through the passing traffic
looking for a deviation from the traffic’s normal profile [2]–
[6]. By way of example, the Sequential Probability Ratio
Test (SPRT) [7], the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) chart [8],
and the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
inspection scheme [9] are the de facto “workhorse” of the
community. The CUSUM and EWMA methods come from the
area of sequential changepoint detection, a branch of statistics
concerned with the design and analysis of a fastest way to
detect a change (i.e., an anomaly) in the state of a phenomenon
(time process) of interest [10], [11].
Yet another changepoint detector popular in statistics is
the Shiryaev–Roberts (SR) procedure [12]–[14]. Though prac-
tically unknown in the cybersecurity community, the SR
procedure is as computationally simple as the CUSUM chart
or the EWMA scheme. However, unlike the latter two, the SR
procedure is also the best one can do (i.e., exactly optimal)
in a certain multi-cyclic setting [15], a natural fit in the
computer network anomaly detection context. The aim of
this work is to offer a novel multi-cyclic anomaly detector
using the SR procedure as the prototype. Due to the exact
multi-cyclic optimality of the SR procedure, the proposed
algorithm is expected to outperform other detection schemes,
in particular the multi-cyclic CUSUM procedure. We confirm
this experimentally using real data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides an introduction to the subject of changepoint
detection. In Section III, we present our anomaly detection
algorithm. In Section IV, we illustrate our algorithm at work.
In Section V, we comment on how to improve the performance
of the algorithm. Lastly, Section VI draws the conclusions.
II. QUICKEST CHANGEPOINT DETECTION
Quickest changepoint detection is a study of techniques to
detect a change (“disorder”) in the state of a time process,
usually from “normal” to “abnormal”; inference about the
process’ current state is made from a series of quantitative
random observations (e.g., measurements corrupted by noise).
The sequential setting assumes the series is amassed one at a
time, and so long as the recorded data behavior suggests the
process is in its “normal” state it is let to continue. However, if
the observations hint that the process’ state may have switched
to “abnormal”, one’s aim is to detect the true change as quickly
as possible for a given risk associated with false alarms, so that
an appropriate response can be provided in a timely manner.
The time instance at which the state of the process changes
is referred to as the changepoint, and the challenge is that
it is not known in advance. This is known as the sequential
(quickest) changepoint detection problem. For lack of space,
from now on we will focus only on the basic iid version of
this problem; a general non-iid case is surveyed, e.g., in [16],
[17].
Suppose one is able to sequentially collect a series
of independent random observations, {Xn}n>1, such that
X1, . . . , Xν are each distributed according to a known prob-
ability density function (pdf) f , while Xν+1, Xν+2, . . . each
adhere to a pdf g 6≡ f , also known. The time index ν (i.e.,
the changepoint) is assumed unknown non-random number;
2for cases that regard ν as a random variable, see, e.g., [12],
[13]. One’s aim is to detect that the observations’ common
distribution has changed. The challenge is to do so with as few
observations as possible following the changepoint, subject to
a tolerable limit on the risk of making a false detection.
Statistically, the problem is to sequentially differentiate
between the hypotheses Hk : ν = k, 0 6 k <∞ (i.e., that the
data {Xn}n>1 change their statistical profile at time instance
ν = k, 0 6 k < ∞) and H∞ : ν = ∞ (i.e., that no change
ever occurs). To test Hk against H∞ one first constructs the
corresponding likelihood ratio, which for the iid scenario has
the form
Λk:n =
n∏
j=k+1
Λj , where Λj =
g(Xj)
f(Xj)
,
and it is understood that Λk:n ≡ 1 for k > n.
Next, as each new observation becomes available to test
the hypotheses, the sequence {Λk:n}16k6n is turned into
a detection statistic. To this end, one can either use the
maximum likelihood principle or the (generalized) Bayesian
approach. In the former case the corresponding detection
statistic is
Vn = max
16k6n
Λk:n, n > 1, (1)
i.e., the famous CUSUM statistic. The Bayesian statistic
depends on the changepoint’s prior distribution. As in our case
the changepoint, ν, is assumed unknown, the corresponding
quasi-Bayesian (or generalized Bayesian) detection statistic
can be defined as
Rn =
n∑
k=1
Λk:n, n > 1.
One can view {Rn}n>1 as being the average of the sequence
{Λk:n}16k6n with respect to an (improper) uniform prior
distribution imposed on ν; see, e.g., [12], [13], [16]–[18].
Once the detection statistic is chosen, it is supplied to
an appropriate sequential detection procedure. A detection
procedure is a stopping time, T , which is a function of the
observed data, {Xn}n>1. The meaning of T is that after
observing X1, . . . , XT it is declared that the change is in
effect. That may or may not be the case. If it is not, then
T 6 ν, and it is said that a false alarm has been sounded.
Henceforth, let Pν(·) and P∞(·) denote the probability
measures, respectively, when the change occurs at time instant
0 6 ν < ∞, and when no change ever occurs. Likewise, let
Eν [·] and E∞[·] be the corresponding expectations.
Lorden [19] suggested to measure the risk of raising a
false alarm via the Average Run Length (ARL) to false alarm
ARL(T ) = E∞[T ] and showed that the CUSUM procedure
has certain minimax properties in the class of detection pro-
cedures
∆(γ) =
{
T : ARL(T ) > γ
}
for which the ARL to false alarm is no “worse” than the
desired a priori chosen level γ > 1. See also Moustakides [20]
who proved that CUSUM is in fact strictly minimax with
respect to Lorden’s criterion for every γ > 1.
A practically appealing way to measure the detection speed
is Pollak’s [21] “worst-case” (Supremum) Average Delay to
Detection (ADD), conditional on a false alarm not having been
previously sounded, i.e.,
SADD(T ) = max
06k<∞
Ek[T − k|T > k].
The minimax quickest changepoint detection problem is to
find Topt ∈ ∆(γ) such that
SADD(Topt) = inf
T∈∆(γ)
SADD(T ) for all γ > 1.
To date, this problem remains open, and only asymptotic (as
γ →∞) solutions have been obtained [21], [22].
The CUSUM chart [8] has been popular in many areas
of engineering and computer science, including cybersecurity.
It iteratively maximizes the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) with
respect to the changepoint ν, and stops once the maximum
exceeds a certain threshold. More specifically, the CUSUM
procedure is based on the statistic Wn = max{0, logVn},
where Vn is defined in (1), which is computed recursively
Wn = max{0,Wn−1 + Ln}, n > 1, W0 = 0.
Here Ln = logΛn is the LLR. The corresponding stopping
rule is
Ch = min{n > 1: Wn > h},
where h > 0 is a detection threshold preset so as to achieve
the desired level of false alarms γ > 1, and thus guarantee that
Ch ∈ ∆(γ). This can be achieved by setting h = hγ > log γ,
since ARL(Ch) > eh for any h > 0 [19]. For large values of
γ more “careful” selection of h is possible [17].
Consider now a context in which it is of utmost importance
to detect the change as quickly as possible, even at the expense
of raising many false alarms (using a repeated application
of the same stopping rule) before the change occurs. Put
otherwise, in exchange for the assurance that the change will
be detected with maximal speed, we agree to go through
a “storm” of false alarms along the way (the false alarms
are ensued from repeatedly applying the same detection rule,
starting from scratch after each false alarm). This scenario is
shown in Figure 1.
Formally, let T1, T2, . . . be sequential independent repeti-
tions of the stopping time T , and let Tj = T1+T2+ · · ·+Tj ,
j > 1, be the time of the j-th alarm. Define Iν = min{j >
1: Tj > ν}. In other words, TIν is the time of detection of
a true change that occurs at ν after Iν − 1 false alarms have
been raised. Write
STADD(T ) = lim
ν→∞
Eν [TIν − ν]
for the limiting value of the average delay to detection referred
to as the Stationary Average Delay to Detection (STADD). The
multi-cyclic changepoint detection problem is to find Topt ∈
∆(γ) such that
STADD(Topt) = inf
T∈∆(γ)
STADD(T ) for every γ > 1.
This formulation is instrumental in detecting a change that
takes place in a distant future (i.e., ν is large), and is preceded
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Fig. 1. Multi-cyclic changepoint detection in a stationary regime.
by a stationary flow of false detections. Such scenarios are
a commonplace in the area of computer network anomaly
detection.
As has been shown by Pollak and Tartakovsky [15], the so-
called Shiryaev–Roberts (SR) procedure [13], [14] is exactly
optimal for every γ > 1 with respect to the stationary average
detection delay STADD(T ). Thus, in the multi-cyclic setting
the SR procedure is a better alternative to the popular CUSUM
and EWMA schemes.
The SR rule stops at time instance
SA = min{n > 1: Rn > A},
where the SR statistic is given by the recursion
Rn = (1 +Rn−1) Λn, n > 1, R0 = 0.
Here A > 0 is a detection threshold set a priori so as to
ensure SA ∈ ∆(γ) for a desired γ > 1. It can be easily
shown [23] that ARL(SA) > A for all A > 0, so choosing
the detection threshold as Aγ = γ will guarantee SA ∈ ∆(γ).
A very accurate asymptotic approximation ARL(SA) ∼ A/v,
A→∞ is also possible, where 0 < v < 1 is a constant which
is a subject of renewal theory. See, e.g., [23].
III. TRANSITION TO CYBERSECURITY
The above somewhat abstract introduction to sequential
changepoint detection is straightforward to put in the context
of anomaly detection in computer network traffic. As network
anomalies typically take place at unknown points in time
and entail changes in the traffic’s statistical properties, it is
intuitively appealing to formulate the problem of computer
network anomaly detection as that of a quickest changepoint
detection: to detect changes in the statistical profile of network
traffic as rapidly as possible, while maintaining a tolerable
level of the risk of making a false detection.
It is common that in practice neither pre- nor post-anomaly
distributions are known. As a result, traffic’s pre- and post-
anomaly profile is poorly understood, and one can no longer
rely on the likelihood ratios. Hence, an alternative approach
is required. Let us first consider a typical behavior of the
CUSUM and SR statistics. As long as the observed sequence
{Xn}n>1 is in the normal mode, the detection statistics
{Wn}n>1 and {Rn}n>1 behave as if they were “afraid” of
approaching the detection thresholds h and A respectively
(although it is still possible that the thresholds will be crossed,
in which case a false alarm will be raised). However, as soon
as Xν+1 – the first data point affected by an anomaly – is
recorded, the behavior of Wn and Rn changes completely, so
that they now eagerly try to hit the thresholds. Formally, this
means that E∞[Ln] < 0 and Eν [Ln] > 0, ν < n. That is, the
detection statistic has a negative drift under the normal regime,
and a positive drift in an anomaly situation. A typical behavior
of the detection statistic in pre- and post-change regimes is
shown in Figure 2.
Consider now the following score-based modification of the
SR procedure
R˜n = (1 + R˜n−1)e
Sn , n > 1, R˜0 = 0
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with the corresponding stopping time being
S˜A = min{n > 1: R˜n > A},
where A > 0 is an a priori chosen detection threshold.
Similarly for CUSUM,
W˜n = max{0, W˜n−1 + Sn}, n > 1, W˜n = 0
with the corresponding stopping time being
C˜h = min{n > 1: W˜n > h}, h > 0.
Here Sn(X1, . . . , Xn) are the selected score functions.
Clearly, so long as
E∞[Sn(X1, . . . , Xn)] < 0 and Eν [Sn(X1, . . . , Xn)] > 0,
for all ν > 0, the SR and CUSUM detection procedures
designed using such score functions in place of the likelihood
ratio will work, though they will not be optimal anymore.
Their behavior will be similar to that shown in Figure 2. Score
functions Sn can be chosen in a number of ways and each
particular choice depends crucially on the expected type of
change. In the applications of interest, the detection problem
can be usually reduced to detecting changes in mean values
along with variances (mean and variance shifts).
Let
µ∞ = E∞[Xn], σ
2
∞
= Var∞[Xn]
and
µ = E0[Xn], σ
2 = Var0[Xn]
denote the pre- and post-anomaly mean values and variances,
respectively. Write Yn = (Xn−µ∞)/σ∞ for the centered and
scaled observation at time n. In the real-world applications
the pre-change parameters µ∞ and σ2∞ are estimated from
the training data and periodically re-estimated due to the non-
stationarity of network traffic at large time-scales. We suggest
the score Sn of the linear-quadratic form
Sn(Yn) = C1Yn + C2Y
2
n − C3, (2)
where C1, C2 and C3 are positive design numbers assuming
for concreteness that the change leads to an increase in both
mean and variance. In the case where the variance either does
not change or changes relatively insignificantly compared to
the change in mean, the coefficient C2 may be set to zero.
In the opposite case where the mean changes only slightly
compared to the variance, we take C1 = 0. The first case
appears to be typical for many cybersecurity applications,
for example for ICMP and UDP Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks (see [4], [5] where the linear score-based CUSUM has
been proposed). However, in certain cases, such as the one
considered below in Section IV, both the mean and variance
change quite significantly.
Note that the score given by (2) with
C1 = δq
2, C2 = (1− q
2)/2, C3 = δ
2q2/2− log q, (3)
where q = σ∞/σ, δ = (µ − µ∞)/σ∞, is optimal if pre- and
post-change distributions are Gaussian with known putative
values µ and σ2. This is true because in the latter case Sn is
the log-likelihood ratio. If one believes in the Gaussian model
(which sometimes is the case), then selecting q = q0 and
δ = δ0 with some design values q0 and δ0 provides reasonable
operating characteristics for q < q0 and δ > δ0 and optimal
characteristics for q = q0 and δ = δ0. However, it is important
to emphasize that the proposed score-based SR procedure does
not assume that the observations have Gaussian pre- and post-
change distributions.
Further improvement may be achieved by using either mix-
tures or adaptive versions with generalized likelihood ratio-
type statistics [19], [23].
Based on the previous reasoning (see Section II) we expect
the multi-cyclic score-based SR procedure to perform better
than the analogous CUSUM procedure.
IV. A CASE STUDY
We now present the results of testing the proposed de-
tection algorithms on a real Distributed DoS (DDoS) at-
tack, namely, SYN flood attack. The aim of this attack
is to congest the victim’s link with a series of SYN re-
quests so as to have the victim’s machine exhaust all of
its resources and stop responding to legitimate traffic. This
kind of an attack clearly creates a volume-type anomaly
in the victim’s traffic flow. The data is courtesy of the
Los Angeles Network Data Exchange and Repository (LAN-
DER) project (see http://www.isi.edu/ant/lander). Specifically,
the trace is flow data captured by Merit Network Inc.
(see http://www.merit.edu). The attack is on a University of
Michigan IRC server. It starts at roughly 550 seconds into
the trace and has a duration of 10 minutes. The attacked IP
is anonymized to 141.213.238.0. Figure 3 shows the number
of attempted connections or the connections birth rate as a
5function of time. While the attack can be seen to the naked
eye, it is not completely clear when it starts. In fact, there
is a spike in the data (fluctuation) before the attack. Also,
controlling the false alarm rate with an automatic detection
system is a challenge.
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Fig. 3. SYN flood attack: number of attempted connections.
We used the number of connections during 20 msec batches
as the observations Xn. We estimated the connections birth
rate average and variance for legitimate traffic and for attack
traffic; in both cases, to estimate the average we used the usual
sample mean, and to estimate the variance we used the usual
sample variance. For legitimate traffic, the average is about
µ∞ = 1669.09 connections per 20 msec, and the standard
deviation is in the neighborhood of σ∞ = 113.884 connections
per 20 msec. For attack traffic, the numbers are µ = 1887.56
and σ = 218.107, respectively. We can now see the effect of
the attack: it leads to a considerable increase in the mean and
standard deviation of the connections birth rate.
We now perform a basic statistical analysis of the con-
nections birth rate distribution. Figure 4 shows the empirical
densities of the connections birth rate for legitimate and attack
traffic. It so happens that for given data, legitimate traffic
appears to resemble the Gaussian process. However, for attack
traffic, the distribution is not as close to Gaussian. We have
implemented the score-based multi-cyclic SR and CUSUM
procedures with the linear-quadratic score (2). When choosing
the design parameters we assume the Gaussian model for
pre-attack traffic, which agrees with the conclusions drawn
above following the basic statistical analysis of the data.
Thus, parameters C1, C2, and C3 are chosen according to
formulas (3) with q0 = q ≈ 0.52 and to allow for detection
of fainter attacks δ0 ≈ 1.5 (versus the estimated attack value
δ ≈ 1.9). We set the detection thresholds A ≈ 1.9 × 103
and h ≈ 6.68 so as to ensure the same level of ARL at
approximately 500 samples (i.e., 10 sec) for both procedures.
The thresholds are estimated using Monte Carlo simulations
assuming the empirical pre-change distribution learned from
the data. Specifically, we took 105 samples from the empirical
pre-change distribution and simulated the behavior of the
respective detection statistics and procedures while adjusting
the thresholds until observing the desired ARL.
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Fig. 4. SYN flood attack: connections birth rate pdf with a Gaussian fit.
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The detection process is illustrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Figure 5 shows a relatively long run (taking into account the
sampling rate 20 msec) of the SR statistic with several false
alarms and then the true detection of the attack with a very
small detection delay (at the expense of raising many false
alarms along the way). Recall that the whole idea of this
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Fig. 6. Detection of the SYN flood attack by the SR and CUSUM procedures.
paper is to set the detection thresholds low enough in order
to detect attacks very quickly with minimal delays, which
unavoidably leads to multiple false alarms prior to the attack
starts. These false alarms should be filtered by a specially
designed algorithm, as has been suggested in [15] and will be
further discussed in Section V.
Figure 6(a) shows the behavior of the logarithm of the
SR statistic shortly prior to the attack and right after the
attack starts till its detection, which happens when the statistic
crosses the threshold. Figure 6(b) shows the same for the
CUSUM statistic. We see that both procedures successfully
detect the attack with very small delays, though at the expense
of raising false alarms along the way, as shown in Figure 5
and discussed above. For both procedures we observed ap-
proximately 7 false alarms per 1000 samples. The detection
delay for the repeated SR procedure is roughly 0.14 seconds
(or 7 samples), and for the CUSUM procedure the delay is
about 0.21 seconds (or 10 samples). Thus, the SR procedure
is better, as expected.
V. FURTHER DISCUSSION
Since in real life legitimate traffic dominates, the idea of
comparing various anomaly-based IDS-s using the multi-cyclic
approach and the stationary average detection delay is a natural
fit for cybersecurity applications. However, it is worthwhile
to remark on a possible way to enhance the potential of
changepoint detection techniques as applied to cybersecurity.
Any changepoint detection method is subject to the following
drawback: instantaneous detection is not an option, unless the
false alarm risk is high. Hence, though changepoint detection
schemes are computationally inexpensive, in practice, employ-
ing one such scheme alone may not be a good idea, since it
will be overflowed with false alarms. The simplest solution is
to increase detection thresholds dramatically, but this will lead
to an increase of the detection delay.
Here comes an interesting opportunity: What if one could
combine changepoint detection techniques with others that
offer very low false alarm rate, but are too heavy to use at
line speeds? Do such synergistic anomaly detection systems
exist, and how can they be integrated?
As an answer, consider complementing a changepoint
detection-based anomaly detector with a flow-based signature
IDS that examines the traffic’s spectral profile. For an example
of such signature-flow-based method, see, e.g., [24]–[27]. The
principal idea is to employ the Fourier transform to obtain the
corresponding spectral characteristics of the passing traffic.
This idea can be used in conjunction with the changepoint
detection-based anomaly detector for both rejection of false
alarms and confirmation of true detections. Higher computa-
tional complexity of the spectral-signature based detector is
compensated by the preliminary changepoint anomaly based
algorithm; the latter triggers the former only when there
is a suspicion of an anomaly may be taking place in the
network link of interest. For practical purposes the mean time
between false alarms of the changepoint based anomaly IDS
can be taken as small as a few seconds, as it was in the
experiments presented in the previous section. We believe that
such an alliance of the changepoint anomaly- and the spectral-
signature-based detectors can significantly improve the whole
system’s overall performance reducing the false alarm rate to
the minimum and at the same time guaranteeing very small
detection delays.
VI. CONCLUSION
We addressed the problem of rapid anomaly detection in
computer network traffic. Approaching the problem statisti-
cally, namely, as that of sequential changepoint detection, we
proposed a new anomaly detection method. The method is
based on the multi-cyclic (repeated) Shiryaev–Roberts detec-
tion procedure where the likelihood ratio is replaced with
the linear-quadratic score. This is done because in real-world
network security applications both pre-attack and post-attack
distributions are different from hypothesized distributions such
as Gaussian or Poisson. Like many changepoint detection
schemes, our method is also of practically no computational
complexity and easy to implement. However, what distin-
guishes the SR procedure is its exact multi-cyclic optimality
in a simple change detection problem where densities are
known, a property that such techniques as the SPRT, the
CUSUM chart, or the EWMA scheme lack. Hence, one may
7conjecture that the score-based SR detection algorithm is
a better cyber “watchdog”. To support this conjecture, we
conducted a case study using a real SYN flood attack. The
score-based multi-cyclic SR algorithm outperformed the multi-
cyclic CUSUM procedure. Lastly, as a possible improvement
of any changepoint detection-based anomaly detector, we
proposed to complement the latter with a signature-based
spectral IDS. This approach will allow to filter false alarms
reducing the false alarm rate to a minimum and simultaneously
guaranteeing prompt detection of real attacks.
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